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Abstract 
Does employee productivity explain why during a period of crisis firms fired 
relatively more blue-collar than white-collar workers and why, when conditions 
improved, they began to hire relatively more blue collars?  Are redundancies 
targeted towards the least productive workers?  Was firms’ behaviour profit 
maximising? 
These questions are investigated in the extreme circumstances of the footwear 
industry in Russia in the period 1994-2000. 
Firms in this industry underwent a major upheaval in these years.  Part of their 
response was to downsize the blue-collar workforce more severely than the white-
collars.  Was this because (a) white collar employees had higher marginal  
productivity   or (b) because the technical rate of substitution of white collar labour 
with blue collar labour was greater than the factor price ratio of these two inputs  
 
If it turns out that the marginal productivity of white collar employees was the 
higher, we could conclude that they were embodying more human capital (Becker, 
1962); if they were no more productive than blue collars, this could mean that they 
had been privileged during downsizing for some institutional reasons, e.g. a prior 
commitment towards higher-ranking staff (Lazear, 1979; Lazear and Rosen, 1981). 
If it turns out that the technical rate of substitution of white collar labour with blue 
collar labour was greater than their factor price ratio, this would suggest that the 
firms’ downsizing policies were consistent with profit-maximising precepts.  
Russian footwear is a suitable industry for investigation because there are many 
units, which use a standard technology, and with relatively little political 
interference.  
 The paper uses Translog and Cobb Douglas production functions with ordinary least 
squares, two-step least squares and stochastic frontier analysis, both in a panel and in 
a cross-section setting. Results show that white collar employees were not only more 
productive than blue collar employees but also the technical rate of substitution of 
white collar labour with blue collar labour was greater than the factor price ratio of 
these two inputs.  This suggests that even in a turbulent period and with a Soviet 
heritage, the firms behaved as profit-maximising agents.  Institutional factors may 
also have operated, but they do not need to be invoked in explaining the data. 
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1. Introduction 
Does employee productivity explain why during a period of crisis firms fired 
relatively more blue-collar than white-collar workers? Does it explain why during a 
period of recovery firms hired relatively more blue collars?  Are redundancies 
targeted towards the least productive workers?  Was firms’ behavior profit 
maximizing? These questions are investigated in the extreme circumstances of the 
footwear industry in Russia in the period 1994-2000. Firms in this industry 
underwent a major upheaval in these years.  Part of their response was first to 
downsize the blue-collar workforce more severely than the white-collars and then 
subsequently to hire relatively more blue collars than white collars.   
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Figure 1 Average number of employees per firm 
 
Figure 1 shows that from 1992 to 1999 the average size of Russian footwear firms 
has decreased. In part this was due to the entry of new firms, but largely it was due to 
the shedding of employees by incumbent firms, which passed from 801 employees in 
1992 to 353 in the year 2000. Figure 2 shows that the share of blue collar workers in 
total employment has decreased from 1992 till 1999 (till 1998 in the case of old 
firms, those already existing in 1992).  In the case of better performing medium-
large firms there is the same downward trend, but some moderate recovery already 
took place in 1997, was probably interrupted by the dramatic events of 1998 
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(financial crisis, devaluation, change of government, etc.) and then continued more 
strongly in 1999-2000. When shedding workers, firms did not treat every worker in 
the same way: blue collars were at much higher risk of being dismissed. It also 
suggests that at the end of the considered period the attitude of firms toward blue 
collar labour changed and this change of attitude occurred first in medium-large 
firms and then in the whole data set in general. 
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Figure 2 The ratio between blue collars and all employees in Russian footwear firms 
 
Was this because (a) white collar employees had higher marginal  productivity   or 
(b) because the technical rate of substitution of white collar labour with blue collar 
labour was greater than the factor price ratio of these two inputs?  i.e.: 
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Where: 
y  is the output of the firm, in value terms, million rubles 1992 
white is white collar workers, in units 
blue is blue collar labour, in units. 
wage is the remuneration of white collar workers, in million rubles 1992  
salary is the remuneration of blue collar workers, in million rubles 1992. 
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If it turns out that the marginal productivity of white collar employees was the 
higher, we could conclude that they were embodying more human capital (Becker, 
1962); if they were no more productive than blue collars, this could mean that they 
had been privileged during downsizing for some institutional reasons, e.g. a prior 
commitment towards higher-ranking staff (Lazear, 1979; Lazear and Rosen, 1981). 
If it turns out that the technical rate of substitution of white collar labour with blue 
collar labour was greater than their factor price ratio, this would suggest that the 
firms’ downsizing policies were consistent with profit-maximizing precepts.  
The available data under-represent small firms, but correctly represent medium-large 
firms. Was the situation the same in the better represented set of medium and large 
firms?  
Russian footwear is a suitable industry for investigation because there are many 
units, which use a standard technology, and with relatively little political 
interference.  
 This paper uses Translog and Cobb Douglas production functions with ordinary 
least squares, two-step least squares and stochastic frontier analysis, both in a panel 
and in a cross-section setting. Results show that for many years white collar 
employees were not only more productive than blue collar employees but also the 
technical rate of substitution of white collar labour with blue collar labour was 
greater than the factor price ratio of these two inputs.  This suggests that even in a 
turbulent period and with a Soviet heritage, the firms often behaved as profit-
maximizing agents.  Institutional factors may also have operated, but they do not 
need to be invoked in explaining the data. 
 
Some references to the literature on the subject are given in section 2. Section 3 
presents the hypotheses. Methodology is presented in Section 4. Data are presented 
in section 5. The results for all firms  are presented in Section 6 and for medium-
large firms in section 7. Conclusions can be found in Section   8. 
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2. References to previous studies   
Several studies have considered the issue of which employees are targeted first for 
redundancies and why. In a firm, which is target of a merger bid “the group of 
employees that top executives may try hardest to protect are their immediate 
subordinates: managers and administrators employed at corporate or divisional 
headquarters.” (Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1990:384).  Many studies suggest that in 
difficult periods, staff reductions tend to fall on production rather than on 
administrative employees. This has been attributed to different possible causes. 
Forms of collusion between supervisor and agent have been suggested by Tirole 
(1986). Becker (1962, 1964) formulated a theory of specific human capital. 
According to it, when human capital is specific to a certain firm, that firm has an 
incentive to retain those employees, who embody it most. This incentive can only be 
weakened by a substantial economic change. 
Blakemore and Hoffman (1989) tested if firms were  retaining or rehiring  senior 
workers 1 because senior workers, embodying more specific human capital, were 
more productive or if senior workers were retained just for institutional reasons, 
finding that staff with more tenure was also more productive. Oi (1962) suggested 
that senior staff were embodying higher fixed costs e.g. deriving from hiring and 
training. Certain employees may have negotiated implicit contracts with delayed 
payments (Lazear 1979; Idson and Valetta, 1996) or rank order tournaments2 (Lazear 
and Rosen, 1981). 
According to Lazear (1979) and Lazear and Rosen (1981) generally employees with 
more tenure or with more specific human capital are less at risk of being fired and 
they have higher chances, if fired, of being recalled; Idson and Valletta (1996) find 
that if a sector suffers a crisis with employment decline, the tenure effect diminishes, 
i.e. it is more probable that companies play opportunistically, not honoring previous 
 
1
 The fact that employment stability increases with employment tenure has been studied by many 
authors (Oi 1962; Parsons, 1972; Mincer and Jovanovic, 1981; Mc Laughlin, 1991.These references 
are reported by Idson and Valletta, 1996:655) 
2
 Rank order tournament is a procedure which puts the remuneration of each employee in relation 
with the rank that the employee achieves and not with his/her productivity. The system is fair if all 
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commitments. However the effect of specific human capital should not diminish if 
there are not technological changes, major enough to make human capital obsolete.  
Devereux (2000) has tested the hypothesis that in periods of crisis firms in order to 
retain senior employees with more specific human capital demote them to lower 
tasks. This is probably only possible if firms have sufficient functional flexibility 
(Beatson, 1995).  
In conclusion, according to the model of specific human capital, having a relatively 
low presence of senior (white collar/ supervisory) staff, could induce firms to have 
lower productivity than firms with a higher presence of this type of staff.  
According to the theory of contracts with delayed payments and to the tournament 
theory, it would not be necessary that firms with more senior (white collar) staff 
were more productive. However, in some circumstances, it can also happen   that 
firms have a lower presence of senior staff just because, with some form of 
functional flexibility and job rotation, they have demoted senior staff to lower 
positions (Devereux, 2000). 
 It could also simply happen that managers fire certain employee instead of other 
employees   because they try to maximize short term profits or minimize short term 
costs.  
 
 
3. Hypotheses 
 
 Both models with specific human capital (Becker, 1962) and models assuming 
contracts with delayed payments (Lazear, 1979) or tournaments  (Lazear and Rosen, 
1981) imply that firms, when facing shocks try to retain those employees which have 
accumulated more experience and seniority in the firm. According to the model of 
contracts with delayed payment, firms would behave so in order to preserve their 
credibility with employees, while according the model of specific human capital 
firms would do it in order to preserve their specific human capital.  Finally firms 
 
employees can compete for certain ranks and if “winners” can enjoy their remuneration till their 
scheduled retirement. 
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could not only try to preserve their human capital, but also pursue short term profit 
maximization and cost minimization. “The cost-minimizing point will be 
characterized by a tangency condition:  (…) the technical rate of substitution must be 
equal the factor price ratio”              (Varian; 2006:354) and therefore: 
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Therefore, if we find that: 
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we can observe that firms are not in an optimal input combination. 
In a neoclassical world the optimizing reaction of firms should be that of increasing 
the relative use of the input with the higher ratio, in this case, white collar labour. 
Therefore if we found the inequality described above, we could conclude that not 
only  firms behaved in order to preserve their specific human capital, when they fired 
relatively more blue collars than white collars, but also as profit maximisers; if we 
do not find such relation, we  cannot invoke optimizing behavior, but if: 
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                                                                                     2) 
 
i.e. if the productivity of white collar workers were still higher than that of blue 
collar workers, we could still suggest that that white collar workers were embodying 
more human capital than blue collar workers.  
Finally if also the inequality 2) above were found not true, it would be rather 
confirmed a hypothesis of contracts with delayed payments or generally speaking 
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some institutional explanation. Firms retained white collars for some institutional 
reason, but not because they were more productive. 
 We therefore test the hypotheses that white collar workers had higher 
productivity/wage than blue collar workers. 
This section has presented the hypotheses of this paper. They are summarized in 
Table 1. 
 
Table 1 Summary of the hypotheses of this paper 
 Effects within a company 
(panel data analysis) 
Effects between companies 
(cross section analysis) 
Specific 
human capital 
A firm was able to increase 
its product more by 
increasing the presence of 
white collars than by 
increasing the presence of 
blue collar workers. 
Firms having a higher relative presence of 
white collars were the ones with highest 
productivity, in the years when the average 
firm reduces the relative presence of blue 
collars. Vice versa in the other years.3 
Profit 
Maximization 
A firm was able to increase 
its average ratio of product 
per paid remuneration by 
increasing the relative 
presence of white collars. 
Firms having a higher relative presence of 
white collars were the ones with highest 
ratio of product per paid remuneration in 
the years when  the average firm reduces 
the relative presence of blue collars. 
Vice versa in the other years.3 
 
4. Methodology 
This section presents the production functions and the models which are used to test 
the hypotheses. We use both the Cobb Douglas (CD) production function and the 
Translog production function. The first is simpler and the second is very flexible and 
can well represent a wide variety of functions.  In some cases the second can be re-
conducted to the first; we test this hypothesis (the restriction). In the whole data set 
the two production functions are used with ordinary least squares (OLS), with least 
squares with dummy variables (panel) and with stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) 
both with a cross section and a panel specification. Following Wooldridge 
(2003:118-119) we have tested for the endogeneity of the explanatory variables; tests 
 
3
 When we use pooled data, we should expect to find the same result that we expect with panel data, 
because there are more years when firms reduce the relative presence of blue collars. 
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confirm the presence of endogeneity. This leads us to use instrumental variables 
(Two Steps Least Squares – 2SLS).  
So now we are going to describe the combinations of models and production 
function. They are presented in Table 2. Additionally all these combinations will be 
used both in a panel and in a cross section setting. 
 
 
 
Table 2   Different combinations of models and production functions, which are used in this 
study. Each combination is used both in a panel and in a cross section setting. 
 
  Model 
  Ordinary least 
square 
Stochastic 
Frontier 
Analysis 
2 Steps Leas 
Squares 
Cobb 
Douglas 
C.D. with OLS C.D. with SFA C.D. with 
2SLS Production 
Function Translog 
Translog with 
OLS 
Translog with  
SFA 
Translog with 
2SLS 
 
 
 
 
 In these tests the objective is the same:  
• We investigate  which labour input has higher productivity. 
 
• We investigate if the ratio between marginal productivity of one type of 
labour (white collar labour) and its remuneration, is higher than that the same 
ratio for the other type of labour (blue collar labour). 
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Ordinary least squares (o.l.s .)  -  Cobb Douglas 
Ln Y = α0      +  αK lnK  + αblue  lnL blue   + αwhite  lnL white  +  ε4 
Y means output, K means capital, L
 blue    means blue collar labour5, L white   means 
white collar labour, α0 is a constant and ε  an error normally distributed. 
 Results for this as for others models are affected by the degree of capacity 
utilization.  With many firms using a limited amount of their capacity we can expect 
difficulties with the estimation of some parameter, in particular with that of capital, 
which is the worse measured factor6.  Besides acknowledging the possible limitation 
that factor utilization brings to the results of this paper we have also tried to partially 
reduce this problem by presenting the results of separate annual cross-sections. 
An initial test consists in estimating the function with OLS without dummy variables 
or fixed effects in the pooled data and in every single year from 1994 to 2000. 
The model is also estimated with fixed and period effects: 
Ln Y
 it = α0      +  αK lnK  + αblue  lnL blue   + αwhite  lnL white  +    αi   +   αt          +  ε 
Where  αi   is a binary variable indicating the firm and    αt is a binary variable 
indicating the year.   In both cases we also carry out the regressions using 
instrumental variables following Wooldridge (2003:83-105) i.e. the 2 Steps Least 
Squares (2SLS) estimator of LIMDEP by William Greene. The set of instrumental 
variables is made up by: 
α0,   lnKt-1,   lnL blue t-1 ,   lnL white t-1  . 
 
Ordinary least squares (o.l.s .)  -  Translog Production function 
LnY= α0  +  αK lnK  + αblue  lnL blue   + αwhite  lnL white   
+ ½ α KK (lnK)2  + ½ αblue _blue  (lnLblue )2  + ½ αwhite _white  (lnLwhite)2   
+   α
 blue _white  (lnLblue lnLwhite)+ α blue _k (lnLblue lnK) +   α k_white  (lnKlnLwhite) +  ε    
 
4
 See Chiang (1984:416) for the marginal product of Cobb Douglas. 
5
  For the actual Russian categories to describe the workforce see Appendix. 
6
  Different authors bring “Strong empirical evidence that (...) capital accumulation cannot be 
considered a significant factor affecting production outcomes during transition in the 1990s” 
(Mickiewicz and Zalewska, 2002:12). In the sample of Angelucci et al. (2002), the majority of the 
capital stock of the average firm is more than 15 years old, and just over 8 percent is less than five 
years old. “The assets of industrial enterprises –especially installed more than ten years ago- are 
usually undervalued, and generally badly measured” (Angelucci et al, 2002:109). 
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This model (Greene, 2003:103 and before and more specifically Bernt and 
Christensen, 1974)) differs from the Cobb Douglas model because it relaxes the 
assumption of constant elasticities. First the function is estimated with OLS without 
dummy variables or fixed effects in the pooled data and in every single year from 
1994 to 2000. 
Then the same Translog function is estimated with fixed effects and period effects, 
here below: 
LnY
 it = α0  +  αk lnK  + αblue  lnL blue   + αwhite  lnL white   
+ ½ α kk (lnK)2  + ½ αblue _blue  (lnLblue )2  + ½ αwhite _white  (lnLwhite)2   
+   α
 blue _white  (lnLblue lnLwhite)+ αblue _k (lnLblue lnK) +   α k_white  (lnKlnLwhite)  
+ 
 
 αi  +     αt   +  ε 
The restriction consists in imposing that:  
α KK    = α blue _blue    = α white _white    =  α blue _white     = α blue _K   =  α K_white     =  0        
If the hypothesis is not rejected, the Translog becomes identical to the simpler Cobb 
Douglas. Therefore we shall test this restriction in order to choose between the two 
specifications. Using the Translog production function, the three elasticities are: 
εY K     =  αK       +  α kk lnK                +   αblue _k lnLblue              +   α k_white  lnLwhite 
ε
 Y blue    =  α blue      +  αblue _blue  lnL blue          +   α blue _white  lnLwhite  +   α blue _k lnK 
ε
 Y white  =  αwhite    +   αwhite _white   lnL white  +   α blue _white  lnLblue       +   α k_white  lnK 
 
 
In 2SLS we use instrumental variables. The set of instrumental variables is made up 
by: 
α0,   lnKt-1,   lnL blue t-1 ,   lnL white t-1  ,  (lnK t-1)2  ,  (lnLblue  t-1 )2 ,  (lnLwhite  t-1)2 , 
  
(lnLblue t-1 lnLwhite t-1),   (lnLblue t-1 lnK t-1) ,   (lnK t-1lnLwhite  t-1).  
 
  
12 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis7 - Cobb Douglas 
We use a cross section specification and a panel version. The cross section 
specification is:   
Ln yi =  α0      +  αk lnKi   + αblue  lnL blue-i  + αwhite  lnL white –i  + νi  –ui 
In it   νi   represents statistical noise and ui (>=0) represents technical inefficiency. 
Also in this case we do not assume invariant coefficients in the whole period and the 
cross section specification has been used both with the pooled data and separately 
with the data of each single year.  
The version for panel data is: 
ln yit =  α0      +  αk lnKi t  + αblue  lnL blue i t  + αwhite  lnL white i t   + νit   – ui 
where  +νit   represents statistical noise and ui  (>=0) represents technical inefficiency. 
λ =  σu/σν     where σu    is the standard error of the disturbance asymmetrically 
distributed and attributed to inefficiency and  σν  is the standard error of the 
disturbance symmetrically distributed and attributed to statistical noise. If    λ→0, 
data do not indicate inefficiency; if λ>1, the presence of inefficiency is confirmed.  
 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis - Translog Production function 
Also in the case of the SFA when we use the Translog production function, we use 
first a cross section version: 
Ln yi =  α0  +  αk lnK i + αblue  lnL blue  i + αwhite  lnL white  i 
+ ½ α kk (lnK i)2  + ½ αblue _blue  (lnLblue  i )2  + ½ αwhite _white  (lnLwhite i )2   
+   αblue _white  (lnLblue  i lnLwhite  i ) + α blue _k (lnL blue  i  lnK i ) 
 +   α
 k_white  (lnK i lnLwhite i )  + νi  –  ui 
This cross section specification has been used both with the pooled data and 
separately with the data of each single year.  
Then we also test using a panel data version: 
ln yit =    α0  +  αK lnK it + αblue  lnL blue  it + αwhite  lnL white  it  
+ ½ α kk (lnK it)2  + ½ αblue _blue  (lnLblue   it )2  + ½ αwhite _white  (lnLwhite it )2    
 +   α
 blue _white  (lnLblue  it lnLwhite it ) + α blue _k (lnLblue  it lnK it ) 
 
7
 The presentation of stochastic frontier models here follows Kumbhakar and Knox Lovell, 2000. A 
similar presentation can be found in Greene (1997). A synthesis is given by Greene (2003). 
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 +   α
 k_white  (lnK it lnLwhite it )        +   νit   –  ui 
Using the Translog production function we test for the hypothesis that the Translog 
function can be substituted by the Cobb Douglas production function as a better 
specification (the restriction). 
Also here the restriction consists in  imposing that:  
α kk    = α blue _blue    = α white _white    =  α blue _white     = α blue _k   =  α k_white     =  0     
 
 
5. Data Presentation 
The database of this paper is taken from Goskomstat8. Our data concern Russian 
footwear enterprises having the industry code 17371, i.e. enterprises manufacturing 
footwear for the  market, but not those firms, which produce footwear, but have as 
main activity the production on order (tailor made production, code 17372) or the 
reparation of shoes and boots (code 17373). 9 
We use the same source of data of Brown and Earle (2000), who state that:  “The 
data do not cover industrial enterprises with fewer than 100 employees and more 
than 75 percent owned by individuals or industrial divisions of non-industrial 
enterprises” (Brown and Earle, 2000:9)10. As a result the Registry of the Russian 
industry has a size-bias, because small firms are not included into it, if they have 
certain specific legal features. In the Russian light industry (table 2.9 in Goskomstat, 
1999b:64  and  Goskomstat,1999c:32) the share of employees in firms omitted by the 
Registry of the Russian industry was in the  years 1996-1998, respectively,  20%, 
23%  and 22 %.   
Here we use a subset of data concerning the years 1994-2000, where, before 
excluding missing records, there are 1698 observations. We opt to present results 
 
8
 Goskomstat is the Russian federal statistical agency. 
9
 Data about the production of footwear for the stocks to be sold on the market (code 17371) come 
together with those of the tailor made (on demand) production (code 17372) and with those of the 
footwear repairing firms (code 17373). One of the first operations of data cleaning  consists in 
eliminating those observations which show an industry code equal to 17372 or 17373.  
10
 A firm should be excluded from the database only if two  conditions are fulfilled: 
a) small size (less than 100 workers) 
b) more than 75 percent owned by individuals or industrial divisions of non-industrial enterprises; 
none of these conditions alone is sufficient to exclude a firm from the data base.  
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about 1994-2000 because on these years we have better followed every step of 
database construction, directly from the source. In the years 1994-2000, 332 
observations have missing records, i.e. 21.19 % of the total; therefore we test on a 
maximum of 1235 observations. However when we use instrumental variables we 
reduce our data set to 1197 observations, because some records do not have a lagged 
value. The statistics concerning all the analyzed data about the years 1994-2000 are 
presented in Table 3.  We can notice that the whole data-set includes both very large 
and very small firms. 
 
 
Table 3  Descriptive statistics  
 (1235 observations) 
 
 Mean St. Dev Min Max Unit 
Output  229.63   470.16   0.03   5,010  Mln roubles 1992 
White _L  64.23   72.15   1.00   696  Men/women 
Blue _L  323.03   414.21   1.00   2,664  Men/women 
Capital  127.01   235.87   0.00   2,721  Mln roubles 1992 
Wage  0.19   0.13   0.00   1.35  Mln roubles 1992 
Salary  0.05   0.04   0.00   0.54  Mln roubles 1992 
LN_OUTPUT  4.03   1.94  -3.66   8.52   
LN_WHITE _L  3.67   1.04   -     6.55   
LN_BLUE _L  5.15   1.20   -     7.89   
LN_CAPITAL  3.61   1.90  -5.53   7.91   
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6. Results using the whole data set11 
The set of results includes the coefficient for the different variables and, in the case 
of Translog production functions, also the factor elasticities, calculated at the 
average values. In the case of the Cobb Douglas production function, factor 
elasticities and coefficients coincide. 
In the case of the Translog production function results include elasticities for the 
three considered production factors (white collar labour, blue collar labour and 
capital).  
Results also report the productivities of the two types of labour and the ratios given 
by these productivities divided by the remuneration of the respective type of labour, 
wages for white collars and salaries for blue collar workers. 
 Results also include λ, which for significant values above 1 indicates the presence 
of inefficiency.  
A preliminary test consists in checking that the Translog production function can be 
reduced to a Cobb Douglas without a significant loss of likelihood (the restriction). 
However even when the use of Cobb Douglas can lead to some loss of log likelihood 
this production function can offer the advantage of offering elasticities with standard 
error calculated by LIMDEP. 
Finally the probable presence of endogeneity induces us to give more importance to 
those tests which have been carried out with the use of instrumental variables (2SLS) 
and to use the others as complementary information, with the considerations that the 
O.L.S. are the most efficient estimates of the coefficients and the SFA provides the 
coefficients of best performing firms and the measure of slack among 
underperformers. 
 
11
 The reader in a hurry can jump to the end of this section where a table summarises results. 
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Regressions on all  years together  
In Table 4 the hypothesis that the Translog production function can be transformed 
into a Cobb Douglas production function, without significant loss of likelihood, is 
rejected, because in all cases the restriction (Rst) is significantly  rejected. 
In the case of the whole data set the productivity of white collar workers is always 
higher than that of blue collars. In the case of panel data, the use of instrumental 
variables shows that a ruble spent in an additional unit of white collar labour brings 
more additional output than a ruble spent in an additional unit of blue collar labour; 
this could not be seen with the use of ordinary least squares and stochastic frontier 
analysis, which are however probably affected by endogeneity problems.  In the case 
of the Cobb Douglas production function, all tests, but panel data with O.L.S., are 
consistent with 2SLS results and in most of cases we have clear evidence of the 
significance of the elasticity coefficients. 
So far there is not only some evidence of more specific human capital embodied by 
white collar workers, but also of short term profit maximizing behavior. We could 
suppose that if white collars enjoyed any privilege (fewer dismissals and more 
recalls), it was maybe because they were more productive, even after considering 
their higher cost.  The S.F.A. seems to suggest widespread presence of inefficiency; 
the parameter λ is significantly bigger than 1. Since the stability of this parameter in 
different years can be questioned, the consideration of annual cross sections can 
bring some additional light. 
 
Annual cross sections12 
Ordinary Least Squares (O.L.S.) 
Annual cross sections are carried out at current prices, avoiding all those problems 
that  deflations can generate, when the researchers use constant prices. Annual cross 
sections also eliminate the issues concerning the changing degree of capacity 
utilization in different years and the stability of parameters. 
 
12
 Results about the whole data-set. 
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Table 4 Whole data set – Cross section with pooled data and panel data - Translog production function (1994-2000) constant prices 
        
 Cross section Panel data  
 O.L.S. S.F.A. 2S.L.S. O.L.S. S.F.A. 2S.L.S. 
N. obs. 1235 1235 1197 1235 1235 1197 
 β σ ε β σ ε β σ ε β σ ε β σ ε β σ ε 
White 1.28 0.24 0.50 1.40 0.22 0.40 -1.75 1.50 0.75 0.05 0.30 0.39 1.40 0.22 0.43 -0.19 0.31 2.41 
Blue 0.03 0.23 0.95 -0.04 0.16 0.88 0.38 0.55 0.61 1.15 0.27 0.84 -0.04 0.16 0.99 -0.46 0.54 0.04 
K 0.06 0.12 -0.03 0.19 0.10 0.05 -1.45 1.81 -0.00 0.15 0.15 -0.05 0.19 0.10 -0.01 1.89 0.61 -1.75 
WW 0.34 0.16  0.49 0.09  0.44 0.25  0.42 0.11  0.49 0.09  -0.02 0.06  
BB 0.47 0.06  0.58 0.06  0.02 0.07  0.06 0.10  0.58 0.06  -0.14 0.08  
KK 0.02 0.02  0.04 0.02  0.40 0.32  0.01 0.02  0.04 0.02  -0.95 0.22  
KW -0.00 0.05  -0.02 0.04  -0.38 0.31  -0.07 0.05  -0.02 0.04  0.11 0.06  
KB -0.03 0.04  -0.04 0.03  0.40 0.96  0.01 0.04  -0.04 0.03  -0.10 0.12  
BW -0.39 0.09  -0.52 0.05  0.23 1.94  -0.18 0.07  -0.52 0.05  0.44 0.12  
Const. -1.89 0.45  -0.65 0.34  2.54 1.13  -2.07 0.74  -0.65 0.34  -0.20 1.32  
λ 
   2.84 0.26        2.84 0.26     
∂y/∂white 1.80   1.43   2.70   1.41   1.54   8.63   
wage
white
y
∂
∂
 9.56   7.63   14.41   7.48   8.21   46.06   
∂y/∂blue 0.67   0.62   0.44   0.60   0.70   0.03   
salary
lueb
y
∂
∂
 
12.2   11.38   7.86   10.8   12.81   0.55   
Adj. R2 .62      .53   .85      .84   
Log likel. 
   -1902          -1722     
Rst 0   0   0.02   0.01   0   0.00   
Rst = p value of the restriction;   
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Table 5 Whole data set – pooled data cross section and panel - Cobb Douglas    (1994-2000) constant prices 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                   Rst = p value of  the restriction                                                         
 Cross section Panel 
N. Obs. 1235 1235 1197 1235 1235 1197 
 O.L.S. S.F.A. 2s.l.s. O.L.S. S.F.A. 2s.l.s. 
 β σ β σ β σ β σ β σ β σ 
White 0.7 0.1 0.69 0.04 1.01 0.23 0.29 0.08 0.60 0.04 1.60 0.18 
Blue 0.73 0.09 0.62 0.03 0.45 0.18 0.83 0.07 0.75 0.02 -0.13 0.14 
K -0.04 0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.05 0.04 -0.05 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.79 0.35 
Const. -2.18 0.18 -0.52 0.17 -1.82 0.24 -1.17 0.36 -0.73 0.13 -4.12 0.91 
λ 
  2.18 0.19     2.01 0.18   
∂y/∂white 2.51  2.47  3.60  1.04  2.14  5.74  
wage
white
y
∂
∂
 13.35  13.17  19.22  5.56  11.40  30.62  
∂y/∂blue 0.52  0.44  0.32  0.59  0.53  -0.09  
salary
lueb
y
∂
∂
 
9.49  8.05  5.83  10.81  9.74  -1.63  
Adj. R2 0.60    .59  0.88    .84  
Log likel. 
  -1951       -1754   
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Table 6 Whole data set - Annual cross-sections     Translog production function - ordinary least squares      
 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
N. obs. 199 201 176 165 169 165 160 
 β σ β σ β σ β σ β σ β σ. β σ 
White 
 0.79   0.62   0.17   0.90   0.04   1.51   1.68   1.32   1.53   0.64  1.06  0.85   1.92   0.55  
Blue 
 0.02   0.50   1.09   0.68   0.21   1.15  -0.05   1.03  -0.14   0.53  0.08  0.67  -0.06   0.53  
K -0.14   0.26   0.06   0.29   0.77   0.43   0.09   0.46   0.16   0.26  0.13  0.27  -0.51   0.32  
WW 
 0.58   0.49  -0.18   0.59  -0.15   0.65  -0.03   0.24   0.95   0.33  0.33   0.39   0.52   0.36  
BB 
 0.43   0.07   0.44   0.15   1.32   0.43   0.85   0.22   1.14   0.31  0.42   0.18   0.32   0.20  
KK 
 0.04   0.04  -0.02   0.06   0.02   0.05   0.05   0.07  -0.04   0.04  0.04   0.05   0.05   0.05  
KW -0.08   0.16   0.35   0.19   0.46   0.24   0.08   0.19   0.04   0.12  -0.06   0.11  -0.14   0.08  
KB 
 0.05   0.11  -0.23   0.16  -0.52   0.20  -0.19   0.14  -0.02   0.09  -0.05   0.09   0.11   0.08  
BW -0.43   0.22  -0.27   0.30  -0.51   0.38  -0.38   0.19  -1.06   0.25  -0.22   0.21  -0.42   0.28  
Const. 
 2.37   1.35   1.09   1.23   0.63   1.69   1.47   2.01   1.30   0.74   2.52   1.14   4.50   1.11  
ε white   0.14    0.94    0.99    0.37    0.03   0.63   0.45   
ε blue   1.04    0.51    0.48    1.15    1.57   0.90    1.02   
       ε k   0.12    0.01   -0.04   -0.14   -0.16   -0.02   -0.02   
∂y/∂white 
 7.25   121.83   131.51    61.83    5.20   268.13  260.78   
wage
white
y
∂
∂
 
 3.16    21.22    16.15    6.11    0.44    14.51    9.82   
∂y/∂blue 
 10.04    12.73    12.90    37.97    64.38    82.13   120.49   
salary
lueb
y
∂
∂
 
 8.05    4.70    3.04    6.64   10.36    8.31    8.93   
Adj. R2 .71  .67  .52  .56  .64  .61  .61  
Rst 0.00  .13  .10  0.14  0.00  .33  .21  
Rst = p value of  the restriction                          
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Table 7 Whole data set - Annual cross-sections Cobb Douglas production function -    0rdinary least squares    
 
 1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  
 β σ β σ β σ β σ β σ β σ β σ 
N. obs. 199  201  176  165  169  165  160  
White 0.71 0.30 1.16 0.21 1.14 0.32 0.68 0.22 0.35 0.22 0.73 0.21 0.54 0.21 
Blue 0.51 0.29 0.29 0.18 0.33 0.28 0.80 0.23 1.17 0.21 0.75 0.15 0.91 0.18 
K 0.10 0.06 -0.00 0.07 -0.05 0.09 -0.11 0.10 -0.10 0.06 -0.03 0.07 -0.07 0.06 
Const. 0.85 0.50 1.86 0.41 2.24 0.62 2.25 0.57 1.62 0.45 2.60 0.39 3.13 0.41 
∂y/∂white 37.82  151.1  151.4  111.7  63.14  310.4  315.3  
wage
white
y
∂
∂
 16.50  26.32  18.59  11.04  5.30  16.80  11.87  
∂y/∂blue 4.89  7.15  8.93  26.53  47.79  68.26  108.5  
salary
lueb
y
∂
∂
 
3.92  2.64  2.10  4.64  7.69  6.90  8.04  
Adj. R2 0.67  0.66  0.50  0.55  0.61  0.61  0.58  
 .
 21 
In Table 6 the restriction indicates that in almost all years the hypothesis that the 
Translog production function can be reduced into a Cobb Douglas cannot be rejected 
at a 5% significance level. Therefore in the O.L.S. context for most of  the years a 
Cobb Douglas function (results in Table 7 ) can be considered a simpler and better 
option. The years 1994 and 1998 are the two exceptions. In almost all cases the 
productivity of  white collars is higher than that of blue collars. The exceptions are 
the years 1994 and 1998 when we use Translog.  
 In almost all years the value of the ratio given by productivity divided by 
remuneration is higher for white collar labour than for blue collar labour. Again 
results about 1994 and 1998 constitute the exceptions.  
 Results may be affected by endogeneity. The use of instrumental variables can 
probably eliminate this limitation. 
Stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) 
The restriction (Table 8) indicates that for years 1994 and 1996 the use of a Cobb 
Douglas production function (Table 9) would not imply significant losses of 
likelihood. For all other years the Translog production function fits significantly 
better the available data. When we use the production function, which the restriction 
indicates, white collars always have higher productivity than blue collars. 
In years 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1999 the ratio given by productivity divided by  
remuneration is higher for white collar labour than for blue collar labour. In the year 
1998 the opposite is true and in the year 2000 there is a very small (2%) advantage 
for blue collars. In all years there is a significant presence of slack. The issue of 
potential endogeneity leads to consider 2SLS. 
Two steps least squares (2SLS) 
Using the Translog production function the restriction suggests that for every 
considered year there is not a significant loss of log-likelihood, if we use a simpler 
Cobb Douglas production function (Table 12).  With this production function the 
productivity of white collars is always higher than that of blue collars. Every year, 
but in year 2000, the ratio of marginal productivity of white collar labour divided by 
a white collar wage is higher than the analogous ratio for blue collar labour. 
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Table 8 Whole data set - Annual cross-sections - Translog production function -   stochastic frontier analysis    (current prices) 
 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
N. obs. 199 201 176 165 169 165 160 
 β σ β σ Β σ β σ β σ β σ. β σ 
White 0.75 1.21 0.84 0.82 0.44 1.47 1.50 1.14 2.22 1.03 1.88 1.03 1.99 0.81 
Blue 0.41 1.11 0.92 0.59 0.29 1.43 0.61 1.20 -  0.44 0.72 -  0.34 0.61 -  0.58 0.58 
K 
-  0.01 0.42 -  0.07 0.36 0.63 0.67 0.07 0.70 0.11 0.36 -  0.01 0.42 -  0.02 0.39 
WW 0.58 0.55 0.06 0.48 0.29 0.82 0.20 0.25 0.94 0.35 0.61 0.36 0.32 0.34 
BB 0.39 0.37 0.55 0.17 1.40 0.84 0.81 0.41 1.17 0.28 0.58 0.17 0.56 0.18 
KK 0.02 0.09 -  0.02 0.07 0.00 0.10 0.02 0.11 -  0.02 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.07 
KW 
-  0.06 0.23 0.29 0.16 0.39 0.30 0.15 0.15 -  0.01 0.13 -  0.14 0.14 -  0.14 0.11 
KB 0.04 0.17 -  0.16 0.14 -  0.40 0.24 -  0.16 0.19 0.01 0.12 0.00 0.11 -  0.02 0.08 
BW 
-  0.47 0.29 -  0.50 0.25 -  0.85 0.68 -  0.63 0.21 -  1.12 0.27 -  0.47 0.21 -  0.33 0.19 
Const. 2.05 1.78 1.90 1.48 1.92 2.56 1.74 2.48 2.31 1.31 4.01 1.48 5.06 1.35 
λ 4.53 1.53 2.82 0.75 3.56 1.11 3.84 1.31 2.81 0.98 3.39 1.24 5.26 2.07 
ε white  0.06  0.78  0.52  0.37  -  0.02  0.42  0.34  
ε blue  1.01  0.62  0.76  1.01  1.42  0.88  0.87  
    ε k  0.16  0.03  -  0.03  -  0.05  -  0.05  0.11  0.12  
∂y/∂white 3.32  101.79  69.05  60.90  -  3.05  178.42  198.69  
wage
white
y
∂
∂
 1.45  17.73  8.48  6.02  -  0.26  9.65  7.48  
∂y/∂blue 9.76  15.31  20.56  33.32  58.38  79.79  102.81  
salary
lueb
y
∂
∂
 
7.83  5.64  4.84  5.82  9.39  8.07  7.62  
Log-likel. -234.1  -276.55  -284.4  -259.4  -258.2  -256.8  -255.1  
Rst 0.83  0.02  0.62  0.02  0.00  0.02  0.02  
Rst = p value of  the restriction                                                             
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Table 9 Whole data set - Annual cross-sections - Cobb Douglas production function  -  stochastic frontier analysis (current  prices) 
 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
N. obs. 199 201 176 165 169 165 160 
 β σ β σ β σ β σ β σ β σ. β σ 
White 0.74 0.11 1.19 0.14 1.01 0.15 2.06 0.04 0.41 0.14 0.61 0.13 0.49 0.12 
Blue 0.40 0.04 0.25 0.10 0.37 0.13 0.69 0.02 0.99 0.13 0.76 0.10 0.77 0.10 
K 0.13 0.07 -0.02 0.06 -0.08 0.07 -0.26 0.01 -0.03 0.09 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.08 
Const. 2.06 0.36 3.16 0.36 4.25 0.60 2.26 0.11 2.89 0.58 3.63 0.56 4.50 0.57 
λ 2.06 0.40 2.54 0.59 2.94 0.74 14.90 0.98 1.88 0.59 1.76 0.56 2.57 0.68 
∂y/∂white 39.45  154.91  134.56  339.81  73.82  257.34  284.51  
wage
white
y
∂
∂
 17.20  26.98  16.52  33.58  6.20  13.92  10.71  
∂y/∂blue 3.89  6.23  10.10  22.84  40.75  69.65  91.67  
salary
lueb
y
∂
∂
 
3.12  2.30  2.38  3.99  6.55  7.04  6.80  
Log-likel. -257.7  -283.3  -293.6  -458  -271  -264  -264  
Rst = p value of  the restriction                                                      
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The elasticity of capital is sometimes positive, sometimes negative and just 
occasionally significant. This result should not be effect of of endogeneity or of 
differences in capacity utilization by the same firms in different years13. The 
absence of data about capacity utilization by different firms during the same year 
could however have influence on it. On the other hand, case studies show that 
some firms were burdened with real estates, which they were unable or slow to 
sell and which were generating costs in terms of property taxes to be paid.   
 
Table 10 Results vs hypotheses in the case of the whole data-set 
 Effects within a company 
(panel data analysis) 
Effects between companies 
(cross section analysis) 
Specific 
human 
capital 
A firm was able to increase its product 
more by increasing the presence of 
white collars than by increasing the 
presence of blue collar workers. 
Firms having a higher relative presence of 
white collars were the ones with highest 
productivity, in the years when the average 
firm reduces the relative presence of blue 
collars. Vice versa in the other years. 
 Yes Pooled data:14 
Yes always. 
Annual data 
Always YES, 
 But  NO in : 
OLS 1994  
OLS & SFA 1998 
Profit 
Maximiza
tion 
A firm was able to increase its average 
ratio of product per paid remuneration 
by increasing the relative presence of 
white collars. 
Firms having a higher relative presence of 
white collars were the ones with highest 
ratio of product per paid remuneration in 
the years when  the average firm reduces 
the relative presence of blue collars. 
Vice versa in the other years. 
 Yes with  SFA and 2SLS 
No with OLS. 
Pooled data14 
 No OLS 
YES SFA and 2SLS 
Annual data 
Always YES, 
 But  NO in : 
OLS 1994  
All 2000. 
 
13
 However let us not forget that a “potential problem with applying 2SLS and other IV procedures 
is that the 2SLS standard errors have a tendency to be “large”. What is typically meant by this 
statement is either that 2SLS coefficients are statistically insignificant or that the 2SLS standard 
errors are much larger than OLS standard errors” (Woolridge, 2002: 102), even if under certain 
assumptions, “the 2SLS estimator is efficient in the class of all instrumental variables estimators ” 
(Woolridge, 2002: 96). 
14
 In the case of pooled data we should expect that results about higher productivity and 
profitability of white collars should prevail, because this is the most frequent situation. 
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Synthesis of results about the whole data set 
 
 
 
Table 13   shows that in almost every case the marginal productivity of white 
collars was higher than that of blue collars. Some doubts remain for years 1994 
and 1998 when we use the Translog production function. Generally we find that 
white collar labour was more productive in the considered period and this could 
support the thesis that white collars were embodying more human capital and for 
this reason were more rarely dismissed.  Table 14  seems to suggest that probably 
firms were also short term profit maximisers, because white collar labour in most 
of cases, especially using the Cobb Douglas production function and  2SLS, seem 
to have a higher ratio between their marginal product and their marginal cost. 
There is contrary evidence for 1994 and 1998 using O.L.S. For 2000 using 2SLS 
results suggest that productivity/wage in the case of white collars was less than 
productivity/salary in the case of blue collars. Also this finding would support the 
hypothesis that firms were profit maximisers. Actually in the year 2000 Russian 
footwear firms increased the share of blue collars in their workforce                   
(see Figure 2). 
Additionally from the use of SFA in Tables 3, 4, 7, and 8 we learn of the 
significant presence of slack among the firms in exam.  
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Table 11 Whole data set - Annual cross-sections Translog production function – 2 Steps Least Squares      (current  prices) 
 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
N. obs. 192 186 175 164 165 158 157 
 β σ β σ β σ β σ β σ β σ. β σ 
White 3.66 15.61 -0.61 1.18 -10.37 136.5 -3.81 28.31 15.24 31.84 2.65 1.66 -2.49 11.35 
Blue 1.41 4.92 0.05 1.37 23.33 453.1 3.48 16.66 -11.14 25.70 -1.08 1.30 1.98 6.22 
K -3.78 13.57 0.71 0.69 -5.47 153.5 3.08 7.04 -2.63 7.28 -0.17 0.51 -0.90 2.07 
WW 2.97 15.38 -0.30 1.79 31.48 748.6 -0.51 12.68 -3.15 9.04 2.11 1.68 -9.00 19.29 
BB 0.65 4.19 0.48 0.17 -7.52 175.0 1.05 1.27 2.99 5.65 0.89 0.57 -2.28 5.49 
KK 1.60 4.72 -0.14 0.26 1.35 31.1 0.10 0.66 0.16 0.88 0.05 0.07 0.66 1.40 
KW -1.66 7.43 0.35 0.49 -8.34 208.2 0.41 4.99 0.26 2.48 -0.39 0.31 0.51 1.51 
KB -0.19 1.45 -0.16 0.34 5.00 131.5 -1.11 3.59 0.07 1.66 0.23 0.32 -1.36 3.16 
BW -0.60 5.55 -0.14 0.99 -6.90 174.4 0.54 5.67 -1.06 4.62 -1.24 0.91 6.18 13.68 
Const. 4.59 9.38 2.58 2.82 -20.38 440.5 -10.71 22.39 16.27 34.17 3.43 2.39 9.66 10.46 
ε white  0.41  0.40  -3.34  0.85  1.17  0.51  1.05  
ε blue  1.25  0.81  3.08  0.69  0.44  0.95  0.48  
       ε k  -0.12  0.09  1.54  -0.19  0.03  0.04  -0.07  
∂y/∂white 22.03  52.30  -443  140.0  211.2  216.2  614  
wage
white
y
∂
∂
 9.57  9.10  -54.33  14.0  17.7  12.0  23.01  
∂y/∂blue 12.15  20.16  83.14  22.81  18.3  87.84  56.73  
salary
lueb
y
∂
∂
 
9.77  7.18  19.53  3.98  2.93  8.82  4.17  
Adj. R2 0.08  0.63  -12  0.41  0.89  0.53  -2.02  
Rst 0.91  0.28  0.99  0.42  0.99  0.40  0.98  
Rst = p value of  the restriction                           
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Table 12 Whole data set - Annual cross-sections Cobb Douglas production function- 2 steps least squares   (current  prices) 
 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
N. obs. 192 186 175 164 165 158 157 
 β σ β σ β σ β σ β σ β σ. β σ 
White 0.34 0.47 0.79 0.33 1.46 0.69 1.48 0.51 1.97 0.72 0.64 0.37 0.23 0.80 
Blue 0.46 0.41 0.40 0.28 -0.37 0.57 0.10 0.31 0.17 0.50 0.74 0.32 1.19 0.62 
K 0.40 0.21 0.14 0.10 0.17 0.15 -0.13 0.20 -0.42 0.16 0.03 0.09 -0.08 0.09 
Const. 0.52 0.51 1.50 0.55 2.73 0.99 3.10 0.92 3.65 0.94 2.38 0.47 2.93 0.70 
∂y/∂white 18.18  102.01  193.73  244.34  355.93  269.60  133.15  
wage
white
y
∂
∂
 7.90  17.75  23.74  24.37  29.85  14.91  4.99  
∂y/∂blue 4.42  9.86  -9.91  3.43  6.90  68.45  141.60  
salary
lueb
y
∂
∂
 
3.55  3.51  -2.33  0.60  1.11  6.87  10.42  
Adj. R2 0.65  0.63  0.47  0.50  0.41  0.61  0.59  
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Table 13 The whole data base - Summary of answers to the question: do white collars have higher productivity than blue collars?  
 
                                                            
white
y
∂
∂
  >   blue
y
∂
∂
           ?                                                                           
 
 Panel 
Pooled -data 
cross 
section 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
 C.D. Trans 
log 
C.D. Trans 
log 
C.D. Trans 
log 
C.D. Trans 
log 
C.D. Trans 
log 
C.D. Trans 
log 
C.D. Trans 
log 
C.D. Trans 
log 
C.D. Trans 
log 
Ols Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SFA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2SLS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
The shaded cells indicate that the other production function fits significantly better the data with that model. 
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Table 14 Summary of answers to the question: do white collars have higher marginal  productivity/cost  than blue collars?  
 
wage
white
y
∂
∂
  >  
salary
lueb
y
∂
∂
    ? 
 
 
 
 Panel 
Pooled -data 
cross 
section 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
 C.D. Trans 
log 
C.D. Trans 
log 
C.D. Trans 
log 
C.D. Trans 
log 
C.D. Trans 
log 
C.D. Trans 
log 
C.D. Trans 
log 
C.D. Trans 
log 
C.D. Trans 
log 
Ols No No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SFA Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2SLS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
 
The shaded cells indicate that the other production function fits significantly better the data with that model. 
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7. Results about medium-large firms 
 
The full data set gives only partial coverage to small firms, but it appears to capture 
nearly all medium-large firms, those with more than 100 employees. The 
Goskomstat rules require that all of these should be included in this database, while 
only small firms with certain legal characteristics are included. With a specific test 
on medium large firms we should be able to obtain a relatively objective picture 
about them. Tables 15-22 report results of tests, tables 23 and 24 summarise results 
and table 25 considers results against hypotheses. 
 In the case of the whole data set tests using a Translog production function show 
that there is some advantage in using Translog with O.L.S. and S.F.A. For annual 
cross-sections only in the case of SFA in 1998 Translog fits significantly better the 
data, therefore usually a Cobb Douglas production function is to be preferred. 
Productivity 
In most of results it is confirmed that white collar labour was more productive than 
blue collar labor, however some important exceptions must be considered. The cross 
section of the whole data base rejects the hypothesis using O.L.S. and S.F.A., even if 
we can argue that cross-section of pooled data probably is not the best way to study 
the issue. In the case of panel data, only in the case of SFA the hypothesis is rejected. 
The results of 2SLS, which should not be affected by endogeneity, always confirm 
that labour productivity is higher for white collars than for blue collars. 
Also in the case of annual cross-sections it is usually true that in medium-large firms 
white collars were more productive than blue collars. However some doubts can be 
raised about year 1994 (O.L.S. and S.F.A.), in the case of 1998 (SFA), 
1999(2.S.L.S.) and 2000 (O.L.S. and 2.S.L.S.).  It is worth reminding that in the 
years 1999 and 2000 medium-large firms increased the share of blue collar workers, 
which would be perfectly consistent with higher productivity of blue collar workers. 
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Table 15 Medium Large Firms - Cross section with pooled data and panel data - Translog production function (1994-2000) constant prices         
 
 Cross section Panel data 
 O.L.S. S.F.A. 2S.L.S. O.L.S. S.F.A. 2S.L.S. 
N. 981 981 961 981 981 961 
 β σ ε β σ ε β σ ε β σ ε β σ ε β σ ε 
White 2.07 0.57 0.09 2.83 0.87 -0.02 3.72 2.22 0.66 2.36 0.79 0.39 2.50 0.77 0.06 0.33 0.61 1.66 
Blue 
-1.42 0.62 0.86 -1.20 0.99 0.85 -6.51 3.32 0.32 0.22 0.85 0.92 -0.60 0.83 0.74 1.29 1.09 0.57 
K 
-0.51 0.21 0.28 -0.57 0.22 0.34 -0.43 0.71 0.02 -0.04 0.24 -0.09 -0.21 0.18 0.30 0.25 0.72 -1.49 
WW 0.27 0.23  0.34 0.14  -3.43 3.20  0.31 0.12  0.20 0.10  -0.00 0.08  
BB 0.85 0.14  0.85 0.20  0.72 0.74  0.41 0.19  0.60 0.16  -0.28 0.16  
KK 0.03 0.03  0.08 0.02  -0.02 0.18  -0.00 0.02  0.06 0.01  -0.26 0.41  
KW 0.08 0.07  0.00 0.06  0.73 0.58  -0.06 0.06  -0.02 0.05  -0.03 0.08  
KB 0.03 0.06  0.04 0.06  -0.43 0.48  0.04 0.06  0.02 0.05  -0.05 0.16  
BW 
-0.68 0.15  -0.76 0.12  1.25 1.78  -0.48 0.12  -0.54 0.09  0.27 0.27  
Const. 6.51 1.82  6.03 2.35  14.03 6.43  0.35 2.76  3.92 2.08  -2.88 3.33  
λ 
   2.29 0.26        2.26 0.26     
∂y/∂white 19.06   -3.62   2.42   79.72   12.93   6.13   
wage
white
y
∂
∂
 
1.67 
  
-0.32 
  
12.83 
  
6.97 
  
1.13 
  
32.56 
  
∂y/∂blue 34.78   34.43   0.23   37.13   29.65   0.41   
salary
lueb
y
∂
∂
 
5.86 
  
5.80 
  
2.33 
  
6.25 
  
4.99 
  
4.19 
  
Adj.R2 0.40      0.10   0.87      0.85   
Log-likelihood 
   -1658         -1470      
Rst 0.00   0.00   0.13   0.00   0.00   0.25   
Rst = p value of  the restriction                                
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                                      Table 16 Medium Large Firms Cobb Douglas    (1994-2000) constant prices        
 
 Cross section Panel 
N. Obs. 981 981 961 981 981 961 
 O.L.S. S.F.A. 2s.l.s. O.L.S. S.F.A. 2s.l.s. 
 β σ β σ β σ β σ β σ β σ 
White 0.33 0.12 0.27 0.07 0.78 0.31 0.44 0.10 0.24 0.06 1.42 0.25 
Blue 0.68 0.11 0.65 0.06 0.63 0.26 0.70 0.10 0.48 0.04 0.13 0.19 
K 0.23 0.04 0.25 0.02 -0.05 0.06 -0.07 0.05 0.24 0.02 -0.04 0.16 
Const. 1.19 0.32 2.83 0.34 -1.85 0.44 3.39 0.65 4.29 0.32 -1.70 0.86 
λ 
  1.81 0.21     2.41 0.28   
∂y/∂white 68.56  56.72  2.86  91.82  49.74  5.24  
wage
white
y
∂
∂
 
6.00  4.96  15.20  8.03  4.35  27.85  
∂y/∂blue 27.61  26.19  0.46  28.10  19.42  0.10  
salary
lueb
y
∂
∂
 
4.65  4.41  4.63  4.73  3.27  0.97  
Adj. R2 0.37    0.46  0.82    0.79  
Log likel. 
  -1695      -1492    
. 
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Table17 Medium Large firms – Annual cross sections            Translog production function-ordinary least squares 
 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
N.obs. 173 160 143 129 130 124 122 
 β σ β σ β σ β σ β σ β σ. β σ 
White -0.45 1.85 1.77 1.09 -0.69 2.00 2.51 2.22 1.32 1.34 2.16 1.41 2.50 1.57 
Blue 1.68 1.81 -2.35 1.37 -0.57 1.62 -2.99 2.25 -0.87 1.64 -1.93 1.36 0.18 1.61 
K 0.03 0.59 0.29 0.48 1.28 1.12 0.48 1.06 -0.06 0.40 -0.08 0.57 -1.86 0.65 
WW 0.39 0.68 -0.66 0.76 0.10 0.94 -0.08 0.22 0.74 0.40 -0.42 0.63 0.79 0.36 
BB 0.18 0.48 1.48 0.30 1.70 0.47 1.06 0.41 1.19 0.50 0.89 0.29 0.07 0.36 
KK 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.10 0.02 0.07 -0.04 0.14 -0.03 0.05 -0.01 0.07 0.04 0.07 
KW 0.05 0.30 0.47 0.20 0.47 0.31 -0.01 0.24 0.09 0.18 0.16 0.21 -0.13 0.11 
KB -0.06 0.25 -0.45 0.19 -0.62 0.33 -0.03 0.23 -0.04 0.08 -0.09 0.14 0.38 0.15 
BW -0.27 0.46 -0.40 0.37 -0.60 0.52 -0.33 0.30 -0.93 0.35 -0.26 0.29 -0.75 0.36 
Const. -0.73 3.79 6.52 3.64 1.84 6.00 6.39 5.69 4.72 4.19 6.71 3.82 8.77 5.15 
ε white  
0.04 
 
0.81 
 
0.80 
 
0.24 
 
0.02 
 
0.66 
 
0.28 
 
ε blue  
1.19 
 
0.55 
 
0.64 
 
0.99 
 
1.61 
 
1.01 
 
1.16 
 
ε k  
0.15 
 
0.04 
 
-0.06 
 
-0.07 
 
-0.18 
 
-0.07 
 
0.03 
 
∂y/∂white 1.65 
 
82.63 
 
95.80 
 
37.01 
 
3.17 
 
265.75 
 
177.05 
 
wage
white
y
∂
∂
 
0.77 
 
17.47 
 
13.31 
 
3.65 
 
0.29 
 
17.97 
 
6.58 
 
∂y/∂blue 8.86 
 
12.92 
 
19.64 
 
34.67 
 
59.13 
 
79.81 
 
121.75 
 
salary
lueb
y
∂
∂
 
7.23 
 
5.05 
 
3.79 
 
5.17 
 
9.02 
 
7.85 
 
8.09 
 
Adj.R2 .66  .61  .39  0.38  .48  .47  .44  
Rst .86  0.08  .13  .45  .08  .33  .96  
Rst = p value of the restriction                
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Table18 Medium-Large firms- Annual cross-sections Cobb Douglas production function - 0rdinary least squares 
 
 1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  
N.obs. 173 160 143 129 130 124 122 
 β σ β σ β σ β σ β σ β σ β σ 
White 1.23 0.31 1.23 0.31 1.20 0.40 0.53 0.24 0.35 0.26 0.87 0.25 0.33 0.26 
Blue 0.21 0.28 0.21 0.28 0.35 0.34 0.93 0.27 1.30 0.27 0.95 0.21 1.15 0.23 
K 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.09 -0.12 0.11 -0.13 0.12 -0.15 0.06 -0.12 0.09 -0.01 0.09 
Const. 1.81 0.67 1.81 0.67 2.53 0.82 2.37 0.82 1.32 0.65 1.74 0.66 2.07 0.72 
∂y/∂white 2.53 
 
125.43 
 
144.34  82.26  63.30 
 
352.23 
 
204.46 
 
wage
white
y
∂
∂
 
1.18 
 
26.51 
 
20.05  8.11  5.84 
 
23.82 
 
7.60 
 
∂y/∂blue 9.08 
 
4.97 
 
10.88  32.54  47.85 
 
74.76 
 
120.02 
 
salary
lueb
y
∂
∂
 
7.40 
 
1.95 
 
2.10  4.85  7.30 
 
7.35 
 
7.97 
 
Adj.R2 .67  .57  .38  .38  .46  .46  .40  
.
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Table19 Medium-Large firms –Annual cross - sections-Translog production function – stochastic frontier analysis (currentprices) 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
N.obs. 173 160 143 129 130 124 
 β σ β σ Β σ Β σ β σ β σ. 
White 
-0.46 1.42 1.71 2.32 -0.33 3.68 3.71 3.30 2.16 1.96 3.41 3.32 
Blue 1.38 1.37 -1.30 2.39 0.70 4.14 -2.82 3.53 -1.72 2.17 -1.81 2.82 
K 
-0.05 0.69 0.37 0.83 1.50 1.27 0.94 1.70 0.39 1.06 0.35 1.28 
WW 0.66 0.69 -0.41 1.36 -0.03 1.69 -0.13 0.48 1.00 0.48 0.03 0.51 
BB 0.04 0.50 1.26 0.96 1.62 1.16 1.07 0.58 1.29 0.44 0.96 0.47 
KK 0.02 0.10 0.05 0.11 -0.00 0.21 -0.07 0.20 -0.00 0.09 0.05 0.11 
KW 
-0.10 0.31 0.38 0.22 0.49 0.45 -0.04 0.32 -0.10 0.17 -0.09 0.21 
KB 0.08 0.26 -0.39 0.27 -0.63 0.42 -0.03 0.39 -0.00 0.18 -0.06 0.24 
BW 
-0.27 0.38 -0.47 1.07 -0.70 1.12 -0.47 0.35 -0.97 0.37 -0.44 0.37 
Const. 1.94 2.61 4.46 4.20 -1.96 9.27 2.92 8.34 4.49 6.53 3.16 7.37 
λ 4.85 1.85 3.28 0.94 3.87 1.32 4.08 1.56 2.85 1.11 4.17 1.64 
ε white  -0.04  0.64  0.30  0.24  -0.10  0.32  
ε blue  1.08  0.63  0.99  0.99  1.48  1.06  
ε k  0.17  0.08  -0.04  -0.07  -0.04  0.12  
∂y/∂white 
-1.83  64.74  36.07  37.01  -17.75  129.68  
wage
white
y
∂
∂
 
-0.85  13.68  5.01  3.65  -1.64  8.77  
∂y/∂blue 8.04  14.64  30.36  34.67  54.32  83.65  
salary
lueb
y
∂
∂
 
6.56  5.73  5.85  5.17  8.28  8.23  
Log-likel. -207.51  -219.17  -225.7  -202.64  -195.51  191.63  
Rst .95  .47  .60  .38  0.00  .32  
Rst = p value of the restriction       
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Table20 Medium-Large firms –Annual cross-sections-Cobb Douglas production function-stochastic frontieranalysis(curren tprices) 
 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
N.obs. 173 160 143  130 124  
 
β σ β σ β σ β σ β σ β σ. β σ 
White -0.11 0.12 1.20 0.16 1.12 0.19 0.64 0.21 0.35 0.14 0.59 0.16  0.19   0.09  
Blue 1.19 0.11 0.16 0.12 0.25 0.14 0.62 0.18 1.12 0.19 0.86 0.14  0.96   0.14  
K 0.15 0.07 0.03 0.08 -0.11 0.08 -0.01 0.17 -0.06 0.13 0.03 0.09  0.08   0.06  
Const. 0.97 0.40 3.28 0.49 4.87 0.72 3.86 1.13 2.65 1.17 3.29 1.12  4.37   0.82  
λ 4.39 1.50 2.97 0.84 3.65 1.46 2.85 1.04 1.84 0.67 2.89 1.10  4.73   1.96  
∂y/∂white 
-4.85  122.26  134.47  99.24  63.43  240.43   122.16   
wage
white
y
∂
∂
 
-2.26  25.84  18.68  9.79  5.85  16.26   4.54   
∂y/∂blue 8.85  3.71  7.66  21.86  41.28  68.30   100.24   
salary
lueb
y
∂
∂
 
7.22  1.45  1.48  3.26  6.29  6.72   6.66   
Log-likel. 
-209.44  -226.66  -234.95  -208.6  -203.1  -197.84  -195.34  
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Table21 Medium-Large firms –Annual cross - sections-Translog production function – 2 steps least squares (current prices) 
 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
 
β σ β σ Β σ Β σ β σ β σ. β σ. 
White 66.04 967.41 18.43 241.00 11.87 47.18 -0.14 20.14 -50.02   80.99   1.53   2.24   9.45   21.20  
Blue 11.96 197.01 -9.40 98.34 -25.14 77.59 -3.95 10.26 -54.90   93.58  -1.83   2.80  -1.17   9.47  
K -48.73 729.72 -5.12 76.96 1.00 6.92 2.90 6.98 -10.11   23.34  -0.96   0.78  -2.15   5.35  
WW 37.06 528.38 9.20 130.92 -13.26 46.67 -4.10 7.39 -30.52   68.84   2.02   1.99  -6.53   9.48  
BB -4.30 111.18 6.64 76.05 3.32 6.62 3.42 2.66  3.86   8.82   0.57   0.79  -0.82   3.08  
KK 7.81 105.50 -1.72 21.72 -0.41 1.55 0.04 0.89 -1.71   3.59   0.17   0.12   0.79   1.28  
KW -16.74 254.73 1.57 15.86 2.25 6.77 1.45 4.22  10.63   21.33  -0.54   0.42  -0.26   1.24  
KB 10.19 169.72 2.47 36.02 -1.17 3.57 -1.67 2.98 -3.23   7.26   0.30   0.43  -0.79   1.35  
BW -15.32 202.74 -12.11 159.64 4.07 16.19 0.49 1.92  14.01   25.45  -0.75   1.20   3.57   4.97  
Const. 7.00 68.39 15.66 116.62 49.97 127.96 3.86 20.52  324.48   520.74   10.91   6.68   0.64   33.14  
ε white  7.55  0.57  2.02   0.17    6.78    0.19    1.22   
ε blue  -2.06  0.21  -1.10   0.87   -9.80    1.19    0.89   
ε k  -1.30  0.55  -0.29  -0.18   -2.23    0.12   -0.15   
∂y/∂white 337.79  58.54  242.08   26.58    1,224.02    73.53    767.59   
wage
white
y
∂
∂
 157.39  12.43  33.63   2.62    113.17    4.06    28.51   
∂y/∂blue -15.46  5.09  -33.88   30.39   -361.44    95.69    93.66   
salary
lueb
y
∂
∂
 
-12.58  1.93  -6.53   4.53   -54.99    9.10    6.22   
R -24.29  -1.87  .60  -1.11  -34.99  .32  -2.42  
Rst .99  .99  .74  .82  .99  .73  .89  
Rst = p value of the restriction       
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Table 22 Medium Large Firms- Cobb Douglas production function – 2 steps least squares (current prices) 
 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
N. 168 153 143 129 127 120 121 
 β σ β σ β σ β σ β σ β σ. β σ 
White 0.17 0.49 0.43 0.49 1.59 0.68 1.34 0.75 1.70 0.77 0.14 0.50 -0.36 1.22 
Blue 0.61 0.38 0.90 0.46 -0.47 0.60 0.19 0.45 0.26 0.62 1.35 0.51 1.64 1.01 
K 0.46 0.23 0.07 0.12 0.08 0.20 -0.17 0.27 -0.47 0.19 0.03 0.12 0.06 0.17 
Const. -0.19 0.70 0.69 0.86 3.57 1.38 3.60 1.34 4.74 1.71 0.98 1.01 1.42 1.73 
∂y/∂white 9.50  58.11  215.31  227.63  318.17  61.43  -
220.95 
 
wage
white
y
∂
∂
 
4.08  9.91  25.94  21.38  25.86  3.31  -7.78  
∂y/∂blue 5.92  22.81  -12.73  6.50  10.90  127.32  198.92  
salary
lueb
y
∂
∂
 
4.80  7.82  -2.87  1.08  1.77  12.89  13.94  
Adj.R2 0.61  0.53  0.33  0.31  0.25  0.41  0.35  
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Table 23 Medium-large firms: Summary of answers to the question: do white collars have higher productivity than blue collars?  
 
                                                            
white
y
∂
∂
  >   blue
y
∂
∂
           ?                                                                           
 
 Panel 
Pooled -data 
cross 
section 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
 C.D. Trans 
log 
C.D. Trans 
log 
C.D. Trans 
log 
C.D. Trans 
log 
C.D. Trans 
log 
C.D. Trans 
log 
C.D. Trans 
log 
C.D. Trans 
log 
C.D. Trans 
log 
Ols Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
SFA Yes No Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes N.A. 
2SLS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No No Yes 
 
The shaded cells indicate that the other production function fits significantly better the data with that model. 
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Table 24 Medium-large firms- Summary of answers to the question: do white collars have higher marginal  productivity/cost  than blue collars?  
 
wage
white
y
∂
∂
  >  
salary
lueb
y
∂
∂
    ? 
 
 Panel 
Pooled -data 
cross 
section 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
 C.D. Trans 
log 
C.D. Trans 
log 
C.D. Trans 
log 
C.D. Trans 
log 
C.D. Trans 
log 
C.D. Trans 
log 
C.D. Trans 
log 
C.D. Trans 
log 
C.D. Trans 
log 
Ols Yes No Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No No 
SFA Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No Yes Yes No N.A. 
2SLS Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No No Yes 
 
 
 
The shaded cells indicate that the other production function fits significantly better the data with that model. 
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Table 25 Results vs hypotheses in the case of medium-large firms 
 Effects within a company 
(panel data analysis) 
Effects between companies 
(cross section analysis) 
Specific 
human 
capital 
A firm was able to increase its product 
more by increasing the presence of 
white collars than by increasing the 
presence of blue collar workers. 
Firms having a higher relative presence of 
white collars were the ones with highest 
productivity, in the years when the average 
firm reduces the relative presence of blue 
collars. Vice versa in the other years. 
 Yes OLS and 2SLS 
NO SFA 
Pooled data:15 
YES   2SLS 
NO OLS and SFA 
Annual data 
Always YES, 
 But  NO in : 
OLS and SFA 1994  
SFA 1998 
OLS, SFA 1999 
SFA 2000. 
Profit 
Maximiza
tion 
A firm was able to increase its average 
ratio of product per paid remuneration 
by increasing the relative presence of 
white collars. 
Firms having a higher relative presence of 
white collars were the ones with highest 
ratio of product per paid remuneration in 
the years when  the average firm reduces 
the relative presence of blue collars. 
Vice versa in the other years. 
 Yes 2SLS 
No OLS and SFA. 
Pooled data15 
 No OLS 
YES SFA and 2SLS 
Annual data 
Always YES, 
 But  NO in : 
ALL 1994  
OLS and SFA 1998 
OLS and SFA 1999 
 
 
Productivity/wage (productivity/salary) 
Here the results are mixed.  Most of the tests indicate that white collars had higher 
productivity/remuneration than blue collars had.  However the opposite is true in the 
panel model (O.L.S. and S.F.A.) and in the pooled data with O.L.S. Additionally is 
not true in the year 1994 and in the years 1999 and 2000, with doubt to be raised in 
1998.  
In the years 1999 and 2000 the situation: 
wage
white
y
∂
∂
  <  
salary
lueb
y
∂
∂
     
 
15
 In the case of pooled data we should expect that should prevail results about higher productivity 
and  profitability of white collars, because this is the most frequent situation. 
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would also support the hypothesis that firms were profit maximisers, because in 
those years medium-large firms started re-balancing their workforce in favor of blue 
collar labor.  We observe at the same time that when blue collar labour becomes 
more profitable than white collar labor, firms start to use more of it. 
It should be added that the elasticity coefficients are not always significant and this 
of course affects the significance of the values of productivities, therefore these 
values require some caution.  
 
 
8. Conclusion  
During the transition years Russian footwear firms downsized their workforce 
between 1992 and 1998 and slightly increased it between 1999 (1998 in the case of 
medium-large firms) and 2000 but the cuts were not uniformly distributed across 
categories of employee.  The number of white collars fell less than proportionally in 
the years between 1992 and 1998 and increased less than proportionally between 
1999 (1998 in the case of medium-large firms) and 2000.  Three explanations (which 
need not be mutually exclusive) have been suggested: 
• Firms behaved in a profit maximizing way, increasing the share of that type 
of labour which at that moment contributed more to profits (or to reducing 
losses); 
• Firms acted as they did in order to preserve their human capital, protecting 
more productive workers; 
• Firms gave privileges to white collars, not because they were more 
productive, but instead for institutional reasons (internal labour markets, 
implicit contract, etc.). 
Results for the whole data set mostly support the first and the second explanation and 
usually make the third explanation redundant.  
Results for the smaller (but better documented) set of medium and large firms 
usually do not reject the hypothesis that these firms were profit maximisers.  
In these firms the share of blue collars ceased to fall earlier (see figure 2) and there 
were fewer years when the use of blue collar labour was less profitable than the use 
of white collar labour. 
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Subject to the qualifications, which this paper has explained (low significance of 
some coefficients and absent measurement of capacity utilization by different firms 
during the same year, see section 4) the results would appear to support the broad 
conclusion that in the very peculiar transitional period from socialist planning to 
market-based competition, Russian footwear firms managed their redundancies in 
ways consistent with principles of profit maximization. 
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